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Abstract-Network management and security is currently one of 
the most vibrant research areas, among which, research on 
detecting and identifying anomalies has attracted a lot of interest. 
Researchers are still struggling to find an effective and 
lightweight method for anomaly detection purpose. In this paper, 
we propose a simple, robust method that detects network 
anomalous traffic data based on flow monitoring. Our method 
works based on monitoring the four predefined metrics that 
capture the flow statistics of the network. In order to prove the 
power of the new method, we did build an application that detects 
network anomalies using our method. And the result of the 
experiments proves that by using the four simple metrics from the 
flow data, we do not only effectively detect but can also identify 
the network traffic anomalies.  
 
I.    INTRODUCTION 
 
Internet traffic measurement is essential for monitoring 
trends, network planning and anomaly traffic detection. In 
general, simple packet- or byte-counting methods with SNMP 
have been widely used for easy and useful network 
administration. In addition, the passive traffic measurement 
approach that collects and analyzes packets at routers or 
dedicated machines is also popular. However, traffic 
measurement will be more difficult in the next-generation 
Internet with the features of high-speed links or new protocols 
such as IPv6 or MIPv6. 
Traffic measurement at high speed links is challenging 
because of fast packet-processing requirement. Though packet-
level measurement can describe the detailed traffic 
characteristics, it is not easy to support high-speed line rates of 
multi-gigabit per second. Moreover, standalone systems for 
packet-level traffic monitoring will be expensive for the wide 
deployment and easy management in a large-scale network. 
Hence, ISPs or big ASes will generally prefer the flow-level 
traffic measurement approach that could be easily embedded 
into routers or switches to dedicated packet-level traffic 
monitoring systems. Currently, flow-level measurement 
modules at routers such as Cisco NetFlow [1] have become 
popular, because flow-level measurement could generate 
useful traffic statistics with a significantly small amount of 
measured data. 
While monitoring the traffic and detecting anomalous 
activities is important, it is equally important to keep the rate 
of false alarms low. A high false alarm means that the genuine 
events will be lost in the “snow” of false events. Suppose that 
we apply one’s statistical anomaly detection method on large 
networks (with thousands of switches and routers involved and 
millions of users), even a very small false alarm rate may result 
in enough false alarms to overwhelm that network operation 
staff. In the worst case, false alarms undermine anomaly 
detection, as operation staff tire of reacting to false alarms, and 
ignore or turn the system off entirely. Currently, researchers 
are still struggling for a simple but robust method for anomaly 
detection, with high detection rate and low false alarm. 
Although anomaly detection has been addressed in many 
prior projects, there is the fact that few works have been 
succeeded in statistically characterized different types of 
network traffic flow anomalies. Furthermore, most anomaly 
detection methods are limited to analyzing the entire traffic as 
one entity, which makes them unable to quantify network 
anomalies, and their validities are affected when many 
anomalous activities occur simultaneously. From that we see 
the need for a method that can effectively detect and classify 
network anomalies based on flow statistics. 
In this paper, we analyze traffic flow information to detect 
abnormal behaviors. Traffic flows are created from all packets 
captured from a network link. There are many network 
anomalies, but whenever a network anomaly occurs, traffic 
behavior will change abruptly. These changes can be inspected 
by tracking various parameters of traffic flows. Not only 
monitoring fundamental flow parameters such as flow size, 
number of packets, which represent major flow features, we 
also statistically collect certain extended metrics in order to 
infer the connection trends of flows. These flow metrics are 
not only used for detecting but also for identifying a number of 
network anomalies as flows in various anomalies has their 
distinctive set of flow metric values. Within each metric, we 
use a standard technique called Holt-Winters [6] to extract the 
anomaly indicators. Holt-Winters algorithm will constantly 
monitor each single metric, and maintain a list of historical 
data for the anomaly detection purpose. Whenever the value of 
a monitored metric goes outside the range of predicted data, 
Holt-Winters algorithm will raise an anomaly flag on the 
metric. The network is then likely to be undergoing anomalous 
activities; this is the case when the system needs attention from 
the network operation staff. 
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Experience has shown that, just giving trivial alerts does not 
turn out to be very helpful for the problem diagnosing. 
Usually, alerts just give limited amount of clue for the 
operation staff to identify and react to the problem. And in 
some cases, a false alarm may cause a huge waste in the effort 
when network operators try to seek for a problem that does not 
exist. Our method alleviates the issue. When flags are raised 
indicating anomalous activities, the network administrator will 
then use the combination of the flag to identify the type of 
network anomaly. Giving out the clue for the anomaly will 
provide great information for network administrators to trace 
back and perform network forensic. 
The organization of this paper is as follows: Section 2 
provides the overview of the related work. Then, in Section 3, 
we describe the core of our anomaly detection method, the 
Holt-Winters algorithm. Section 4 will describe the most 
popular malicious network traffic attacks and the way to 
identify each ones, the overall of our technique will be 
summarized at the end of Section 4. Section 5 describes how 
to build the flow monitoring system, the flow monitoring 
application that uses our new method and its experimental 
results. Finally, the conclusions and future directions will be 
given in Section 6. 
 
II.    RELATED WORK 
 
As stated above, anomaly detection has been addressed in 
many prior projects, and previous works have primarily 
focused on security tasks (detecting DDoS attacks, worms, or 
other intrusion…). In many cases, providers use very simple 
techniques for anomaly detection, such as fixed threshold, 
packet capturing and analyzing… for the case of DDoS 
detection, Cisco and Juniper [2] also embedded in their routers 
a simple flood attack protection based on threshold technique. 
For the 3
rd
 party solutions in network traffic anomaly detection 
such as D-Ward, Multops… they also tried to define 
thresholds for TCP, UDP and ICMP applications, then an 
attack or anomalous activities will be detected and given alarm 
whenever a threshold is exceeded. These methods are quite 
limited since there is no fixed threshold for different kind of 
networks. Also these methods call for experienced network 
operators to define thresholds and constantly monitor and 
modify them. 
There has however been some more sophisticated works in 
the detection and analysis of network anomalies. Instances are 
[7] [8] [9] [10] [11]. Of these, the most directly relevant to this 
paper is [11] which tests the use of Holt-Winters forecasting 
technique for network anomaly detection. In this paper, we 
also focus on exploiting Holt-Winters algorithm for the 
anomaly detection purpose, but with a different way. Holt-
Winters will be used for monitoring the 4 predefined metrics 
and the network administrator will identify the anomaly when 
it happens based on anomaly flags of the metrics. (Of course, 
we did make some modifications on the original Holt-Winters 
algorithm in our experimental implementation.) Although the 
method we use here is very simple, it gives good performance 
and detecting result. And it’s quite open in the mean that other 
researchers can easily apply our techniques in the combination 
with theirs to improve their detection schemes. 
 
III.    HOLT-WINTERS FORECASTING TECHNIQUE 
 
Holt-Winters Forecasting is a sophisticated algorithm that 
builds upon exponential smoothing. Holt-Winters Forecasting 
rests on the premise that the observed time series can be 
decomposed into three components: a baseline, a linear trend, 
and a seasonal effect. The algorithm presumes each of these 
components evolves over time and this is accomplished by 
applying exponential smoothing to incrementally update the 
components. The prediction is the sum of the three 
components: 
 
 yt+1 = at + bt + ct+1-m. (1) 
The update formulas for the three components, or 
coefficients a, b, c are: 
 Baseline (“intercept”): 
 at = α ( yt + ct-m ) + ( 1 – α )( at-1 + bt-1 ) . (2) 
 Linear Trend (“slope”): 
 bt = β ( at – at-1 ) + ( 1 – β ) bt-1. (3) 
 Seasonal Trend: 
 ct = γ ( yt – at ) + ( 1 – γ ) ct-m. (4) 
 
As in exponential smoothing, the updated coefficient is an 
average of the prediction and an estimate obtained solely from 
the observed value yt, with fractions determined by a model 
parameter (α, β, γ). Recall m is the period of the seasonal 
cycle; so the seasonal coefficient at time t references the last 
computed coefficient for the same time point in the seasonal 
cycle. 
The new estimate of the baseline is the observed value 
adjusted by the best available estimate of the seasonal 
coefficient (ct-m). As the updated baseline needs to account for 
change due to the linear trend, the predicted slope is added to 
the baseline coefficient. The new estimate of the slope is 
simply the difference between the old and the new baseline (as 
the time interval between observations is fixed, it is not 
relevant). The new estimate of the seasonal component is the 
difference between the observed value and the corresponding 
baseline. 
α, β and γ are the adaptation parameters of the algorithm 
and 0 < α, β, γ < 1. Larger values mean the algorithm adapts 
faster and predictions reflect recent observations in the time 
series; smaller values means the algorithm adapts slower, 
placing more weight on the past history of the time series. 
These values should be optimized when the algorithm is 
implemented. 
 
IV.    NETWORK TRAFFIC ANOMALIES 
 
Within the scope of this paper, we address a set of network-
centric anomalies which exhibit abnormal changes in network 
traffic. Other kinds of application-related attacks such as 
buffer overflow, guess password … are not included in the 
proposed method because their malicious purposes are carried 
within the payload of the packets. 
 
A.   UDP flood 
A UDP flood attack is a kind of DoS attack. An attack can 
be initiated by sending a large number of UDP packets to 
random ports on a remote host. As the result, the distant host 
will check for the application listening on this port. After 
seeing that no application listens on the port, the host will 
reply with an ICMP “Destination Unreachable” packet. Thus, 
for a large number of UDP packets, the victimized system will 
be forced into sending many ICMP packets, eventually leading 
it to unreachable by other clients. If enough UDP packets are 
delivered to the ports on the victim, the system will go down. 
When a network undergoes a UDP flood attack, it is 
expected from the perspective view of flow that there will be a 
tremendous amount of UDP datagrams from one or many 
outside sources to a specific destination on the network. In 
order to detect and identify this type of attack, we need to 
work with the flow size and packet count of the flows. Flows 
of UDP flood contain many large-sized packets with the 
intention to overwhelm the destination. Therefore, they will 
likely to have large values of these two metrics. We then 
hereby define the first two metrics: 
 TotalBytes: total volume of flows in bytes. 
 TotalPackets: total packets in flows. 
The monitoring process over the first two metrics may plot a 
noticeable increase of the metrics when network under attack. 
 
B.   ICMP flood 
ICMP flood or ping flood is a simple attack where the 
attacker overwhelms the victim with ICMP Echo Request 
(ping) packets with different sizes. This method is an upgrade 
from its predecessor, the Ping-of-Death attack. PoD tries to 
send an over-sized ping packet to the destination with the hope 
to bring down the destination system due to the system’s lack 
of ability to handle huge ping packets. Ping flood brings the 
attack to a new level by simply flood the victim with huge ping 
traffic. The attacker hopes that the victim will too busy 
responding to the ICMP Echo Reply packets, thus consuming 
outgoing bandwidth as well as incoming server bandwidth. 
Similar to UDP flood, ICMP attack also generate a huge 
amount of data towards the destination. So using TotalBytes 
and TotalPackets is enough to plot this type of attack. Of 
course, using the same method means that we can’t distinguish 
ICMP from UDP flood since we use the same signature for the 
two types of attack. This problem can easily be solved by 
using another metric for monitoring the total number of ICMP 
or UDP traffic going into the network; then when the attack 
occurs, we can easily distinguish between the two. In this 
paper, however, we will treat these two attacks the same way. 
 
C.   TCP SYN attack 
This method takes advantage of a flaw in how many hosts 
implement the TCP three-way handshake. When host B 
receives the SYN request from host A, it must keep track of 
the partially opened connections in a “listening queue” for at 
least n seconds (e.g.: 75 seconds). Many host implementations 
can only keep track of a very limited number of connections. A 
malicious host can exploit the small size of the listen queue by 
sending multiple SYN requests to a host, but never reply to the 
sent back SYN and ACK. By doing so, the destination host’s 
listening queue will be quickly filled up, and it will stop 
accepting new connections. 
Due to the characteristic of TCP SYN, the effect of this 
attack on network traffic is quite different from the two 
previous attacks. Flows of TCP SYN have small values. The 
real number of packets differs from each attack 
implementations, but usually the flows contain less that 3 small 
size packets. Since the attacker just has to generate a small 
amount of network traffic in order to bring down a particular 
host, we can’t rely on TotalBytes or TotalPackets to plot this 
kind of attack; we need to define a new metric that can group 
together all flows in the attack: 
 
 DSocket: number of flows with similar volume to the 
same destination socket (IP and port). 
 
D.   Portscan 
A portscan attack is carried out with a port scanner, a piece 
of software to search a network host for open ports. A port 
scanner is often used by network administrators to check the 
security of their networks, and it also used by hackers to 
compromise the system security. Many exploits rely upon port 
scans, for example to find open ports and send large quantities 
of data in an attempt to trigger a condition known as buffer 
overflow, or to send some specific port data packets with 
malicious purposes … 
A portscan operation will result a big number of packets sent 
from a remote host to a destination on the network, but with 
different destination ports. Flows in portscan are small flows 
with the size of only several bytes and packet count of 2 or 3. 
This malicious activity cannot be detected with the three 
metrics we already have. In order to gather together all flows 
in a portscan attack for the detection purpose, we need to 
define another metric that has the capability to aggregate all 
these flows: 
 
 DPort: number of flows that have a similar volume, same 
source and destination address, but to different ports. 
 
E.   Anomaly detection and identification 
TABLE I 
ANOMALY IDENTIFICATION TABLE WITH THE FOUR METRICS 
 
Anomaly TotalBytes TotalPackets DSocket DPort 
Flooding High High Normal Normal 
TCP SYN Normal Normal High Normal 
Portscan Normal Normal Normal High 
Normal Normal Normal Normal Normal 
Other - - - - 
 
Bases on the analysis above, we can summarize our method 
within the flow distribution table for the flow metrics as shown 
in Table I. In our Holt-Winters implementation, the deviation 
or the time-series data at the time t, dt, and the normal traffic 
range are calculated by: 
 
 ˆ| | (1 )t t t t md y y d      . (5) 
And: 
 ˆ
t t my d   . (6) 
 
If yt is above or below the range above, then the traffic is 
HIGH or LOW, respectively. Whenever a LOW traffic 
anomaly occurs, is most likely to be network device outages. 
That type of anomalies is not the main addressing point in our 
research; therefore we will focus on the HIGH traffic anomaly. 
Based on the anomaly flags raised by the Holt-Winters 
algorithm, the network administrator can spot the anomaly and 
quickly identify it. 
Our proposed method has some advantages over the others.  
Our method give anomaly detection based on the combination 
of different flow metrics. The distribution table of our method 
is simple, despite its good performance. Whenever an anomaly 
is detected, the combination of the flags gives us the idea 
about what is happening in the network. Experience has shown 
that this information is at great value to network operators to 
perform trace back and problem forensic. Besides, we do not 
treat the network traffic as one entity. The detection scheme is 
based on the four metrics. Therefore, we can still distinguish 
many types of anomalies when they occur simultaneously (e.g.: 
if network under both TCP SYN and Portscan attack, DSocket 
and DPort will both raise the alarm). 
 
V.    EXPERIMENTS 
 
A.   Flow data collecting 
In order to conduct the experiment of our research, we first 
start with defining the data structure to be gathered. The data 
have to be simple, but contains enough information for the 
calculation of the four flow metrics. There are many flow data 
structures that can be used to acquire the objective above, 
examples are sFlow, nFlow, NetFlow v5, v9 [1], IPFIX [3]. 
Cisco NetFlow v5 is the most commonly used data structure 
for flow-level monitoring in current IPv4 networks. However, 
NetFlow v5 has a fixed key structure and is not capable of 
monitoring various kinds of new network protocols and IPv6 
traffic [13]. To tackle the drawback of NetFlow v5, IPFIX is 
equipped with the flexible and extensible template 
architecture, and it uses reliable SCTP/TCP as the default 
transport protocol. Therefore in our research, we will collect 
the data in IPFIX format with the IPFIX template depicted in 
Fig. 2. 
However, there is one problem working with IPFIX. Since 
IPFIX is a new standard and not yet available in all network 
devices; our router, unfortunately, is incapable of collecting 
flow data in IPFIX format. To fix the problem, we use a 
modified version of JNCA [4] to collect flows in NetFlow v9 
format at the flow collector, and then we convert the relevant 
fields into IPFIX and insert the data into a MySQL database 
for further analysis. 
 
B.   Anomaly network testbed 
An IPFIX network testbed for the experiments is depicted in 
Fig. 3. We tried to shape the real attack environment. There 
are two networks: attacking network and destination network. 
They are connected together by two or more routers. In order 
to simulate “beautiful” flow data, we made the victim (or 
destination of attacks) a web server with common services to 
provide network traffic including: web browsing, email, 
database access, file transfer … All accesses to these services 
are legitimate traffic. 
Router R1 is the gateway router of the destination network, 
it has to be able to export flow data in NetFlow v9/IPFIX 
format. The exported flow data will be sent to the IPFIX 
collector, which located in the destination network. On the 
IPFIX collector, we run some essential programs to collect and 
analyze flow data: JNCA for converting NetFlow v9 to IPFIX 
format, MySQL database for storing flow data and FlowMon 
(the application built by us) for monitoring flow data and 
raising anomaly flags. The malicious data can be carried out 
by The Hacker Toolkit [5], or many attacking tools such as 
stream2, synhose, synk7, synend, hping [14] … however, the 
usage of these malicious tools will not be stated in our paper. 
 
 
Fig. 2. IPFIX template with the highlighted fields involved in the 
monitoring metrics 
 
 
Fig. 3. The experimental environment for measurement of flow 
parameters. 
C.   Experimental results 
At first, we set the testbed network up and running for 2 
days without any anomalies to model the normal traffic pattern 
of the network. Holt-Winters algorithm will constantly monitor 
and study the normal data. This will provide the baseline 
values of normal network condition. Then we start to insert the 
anomalous data for 3 hours with a set of network anomalies 
including: UDP flood, ICMP flood, TCP SYN and Portscan. 
Attack data will be destined to the victim. The attack scenario 
is staged by the tools talked above and each attack will occurs 
in about 5 minutes. Flow data from attackers will be captured 
by the router and exported to the exporter for storing and 
analyzing. The detection results are shown in Table II. 
In Table II, flooding attacks include both UDP and ICMP 
flooding. Just as we expected, almost all the inserted attacks 
are detected by FlowMon right after they occurred. We tested 
the validity of our method in the scenario of multiple 
anomalies occur at the same time and with different anomalies 
combination: UDP + TCP, ICMP + Portscan … FlowMon still 
be able to raise the exact flags according to the anomaly type. 
In the case of TCP SYN and Portscan, all the small malicious 
flows that go through the router were plotted by DSocket and 
DPort, and all these attacks were detected and identified. Our 
method still works well when we switch the attacking method 
from 1 source – 1 destination (flooding) to multi sources – 1 
destination (Distributed flooding). 
However, the validity of our method is affected at the end of 
our 3 hours experiment. After more than 2 hours of gradually 
inserting the anomalies, we continuously tried to insert 
flooding/distributed flooding attacks into the destination 
network in high density. Here then FlowMon could not detect 
one of the last attacks. The phenomenon can be explained by 
examining Holt-Winters algorithm. One of the features of 
Holt-Winters algorithm is to gradually adapt to the current 
values of the time series. When anomalies happen constantly, 
after a certain amount of time, the anomaly data became 
familiar. Holt-Winters algorithm will adapt itself to the 
anomaly data, and consider anomaly data normal. To prevent 
that issue from happening, network operators should quickly 
react to the anomalies, and have solutions to stop them from 
occurring for a long time. How to protect the network from 
anomalies, however, is outside the scope of this paper. 
 
VI.    CONCLUSION 
 
So far in our research, we proposed a new method for 
network traffic anomaly detection with four predefined 
metrics: TotalBytes, TotalPackets, DSocket, DPort. We also 
built a network testbed and a program called FlowMon to 
certify the feasibility of our method. Based on the algorithm 
and experiment verification, the method has proved its 
efficiency in anomaly detection. This research was dedicated 
to deal with network centric anomalies that exhibit abnormal 
changes in network traffic, and our contribution is a new 
lightweight method that does not only quickly detect network 
anomalies, but can also pin point what kind of anomaly it is. 
The method is simple, but it should be seen as an advantage, as 
simplicity makes the method scalable, and more easily 
extendible to include other features, for instance, new metrics 
for other kinds of network anomaly, or applying wavelet 
analysis for better anomaly detection rate. That’s why the 
method has great potential to be re-used in further researches. 
For future direction from this research, we would like 
improve the detection result by implementing more 
sophisticated algorithms for monitoring the metrics, such as 
ARAR algorithm [6] or wavelet analysis technique, then we 
can choose the best algorithm for each case. Besides, our 
method is open in the mean that whenever an unknown 
anomaly occurs, we can grasp its abnormal behavior and flow 
characteristics for further study. 
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TABLE II 
DETECTION RESULT FOR SIMULATION DATA 
 
Anomaly Inserted / Detected 
Flooding 28 / 26 
Distributed flooding 11 / 10 
TCP SYN 13 / 13 
Portscan 15 / 15 
Other anomalies 0 / 0 
 
